State v. Carmouche Respondent\u27s Cross Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 38554 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-11-2013
State v. Carmouche Respondent's Cross Appellant's
Brief Dckt. 38554
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Carmouche Respondent's Cross Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38554" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 501.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/501
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-AppellantJCross-Respondent, ) NO. 38554 
) 
v. ) Canyon County CR 2010-16895 
) 
DARREN DUSTIN CARMOUCHE, ) RESPONDENT'S/ 
) CROSS-APPELLANT'S 
Defendant-RespondentJCross-Appellant. ) BRIEF 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
BRI OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
1.S.B. # 5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
1.S.B. #6247 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
l.S.B. #7901 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 2 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................. 17 
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 18 
I. This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because This 
Appeal Is Barred By The Constitutional Prohibition Against 
Double Jeopardy Set Forth In The Fifth Amendment ......................... 18 
A. Introduction ................................................................................... 18 
B. Standard of Review ....................................................................... 18 
C. This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because 
This Appeal Is Barred By The Constitutional Prohibition 
Against Double Jeopardy .............................................................. 19 
1. The Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against Double 
Jeopardy Precludes Retrial Of A Defendant Defendant's 
Favor, Regardless Of The Legal Soundness Of Any 
Ruling Excluding The State's Following An Acquittal That 
Resolved An Element Of The Offense In The Evidence .......... 19 
2. The Existence Of Two Prior Felony Convictions Is An 
Essential Element Of The Sentencing Enhancement 
As A Persistent Violator Under l.C. 19-2514; And The 
District Court Resolved This Element In Mr. Carmouche's 
Favor Upon Excluding Some The State's Evidence, 
And Thereafter Acquitted Mr. Carmouche Of This 
Enhancement; And ThereforeThe State's Appeal 
Is Barred By Double Jeopardy ................................................. 21 
II. Assuming Arguendo, That The State's Appeal Is Not Brought 
In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against 
Double Jeopardy, The State Has Failed To Show Error On 
The Part Of The District Court In Acquitting Mr. Carmouche 
Of The State's Persistent Violator Enhancement 
Allegations .......................................................................................... 27 
A. Introduction .................................................................................. 27 
B. Assuming Arguendo, That The State's Appeal Is Not 
Brought In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment Prohibition 
Against Double Jeopardy, The State Has Failed To Show 
Error On The Part Of The District Court In Acquitting 
Mr. Carmouche Of The State's Persistent Violator 
Enhancement Allegations .............................................................. 28 
1. Because The State Has Failed To Present An 
Adequate Record Of The Full Proceedings Relating 
To Mr. Carmouche's Acquittal Of The Persistent 
Violator Allegation, The Missing Portions Of The 
Record Should Be Presumed By This Court To 
Support The District Court's Ruling In This Case; 
And The Invited Error Doctrine Should Be Applied By 
This Court To Estop The State's Claim That The 
District Court Erred By Failing To Consider 
Inadmissible Evidence ............................................................. 28 
2. The District Court Properly Excluded Improper 
Hearsay Evidence From Its Consideration With 
Regard To The State's Evidence Tendered In 
Support Of The Persistent Violator Allegation In 
This Case ................................................................................. 30 
3. Even Assuming Error In The District Court's Exclusion 
Of The Evidence, Any Error Is Harmless ................................. 32 
Ill. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level 
Of A Fundamental Error, When The Prosecutor Argued 
Evidence Of Mr. Carmouche's Refusal To Permit Police To 
Enter His Home As Supporting An Inference Of Guilt Of 
The Charged Offenses ....................................................................... 34 
A. Introduction .................................................................................... 34 
B. Standard of Review ....................................................................... 34 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The 
Level Of A Fundamental Error, When The Prosecutor 
Argued Evidence Of Mr. Carmouche's Refusal To Permit 
Police To Enter His Home As Supporting An Inference 
ii 
Of Guilt Of The Charged Offenses ................................................ 35 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 40 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 41 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ......................................................... 19 
Blueford v. Arkansas,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012) ........................ 23, 24 
Brinton v. Johnson, 41 Idaho 583 (1925) ............................................................ 31 
Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 952 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2008) ................................ 18 
Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255 (Ct. App. 2010) ............................................... 29 
Goody v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 Idaho 523 (1933) ...................................... 31 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) ..................................................... 19 
Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 n.4 (1977) ..................................................... 23 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) ...................................................... 38 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) ............................................................... 19 
Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100 (2011) ............................................................. 31 
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) ....................................... 21, 26, 27 
Schwartzmi/ler v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18 ( 1978) ................................................... 36 
Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252 (1950) .......................................................... 31 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................................... 29 
State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................................... 38 
State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 1986) .................................................. 21 
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222 (1985) ............................................................... 29 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................. 36, 37 
State v. Donohoe, 126 Idaho 989 (Ct. App. 1995) .............................................. 30 
State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510 (2007) .............................................................. 18 
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999) ......................................... 32, 33 
State v. Howard, 150 Idaho 471(2011) ........................................................ 22,23 
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35 (1903) ................................................................... 36, 37 
State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516 (1986) ............................................................. 38 
State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2012) .................................................... 27 
State v. Miles, 464 P.2d 723 (Wa. 1970) ............................................................ 31 
iv 
State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 1993) ........................................... 25, 26 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) ............................................................ 34, 36 
State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707 ( 1991) ................................................................ 31 
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795 (1991) ............................................................ 18 
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498 (1980) ................................................................. 36 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482 (2009) ................................................... 28, 29 
State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478 (Ct. App. 2012) .................................................. 38 
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705 (2009) ................................................................ 18 
United States v. Blanton, 476 F. 3d 767 (91h Cir. 2008) ................................ 24, 25 
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) ................................................... 23 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) ............. 19, 20, 22 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) ......................................................... 20 
United States v. Smalis, 476 U.S. 140 n.7 (1986) ........................................ 20, 21 
Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652 (Ct. App. 2008) .................................................. 18 
Statutes 
lo. CONST. art. I, §13 ........................................................................................... 36 
Idaho Code§ 19-2514 .................................................................................. 21, 33 
U.S. Const. amend. V ......................................................................................... 36 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ...................................................................................... 36 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Darren Carmouche was convicted, following a jury trial, of attempted 
strangulation, second degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and felony domestic 
violence with traumatic injury. He was acquitted, following a bench trial, of the State's 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement allegations for each of these offenses. 
The State appeals from the district court's acquittals, and argues: (1) that the 
district court was required to consider improper hearsay evidence because that 
evidence was presented without objection during the bench trial; (2) that a new trial, 
rather than an acquittal, should have been the remedy for the evidentiary deficiency that 
occurred in the absence of the improper evidence; and (3) that the evidence aside from 
the improper hearsay evidence was nonetheless sufficient to convict Mr. Carmouche of 
the enhancement. Mr. Carmouche asserts that the State's appeal in this case seeks 
relief that would violate his Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy in light 
of the fact that the district court entered a factual acquittal on the merits of the persistent 
violator allegation, thus barring any attempt at retrial. Accordingly, the State's appeal is 
moot. Additionally, Mr. Carmouche asserts that, with regard to the first claim alleged by 
the State, this assertion is directly contrary to the standards attendant on trials where a 
judge, rather than a jury, is the trier of fact. Further, the State has failed to present a 
complete record of the relevant proceedings regarding this acquittal, and therefore the 
absent portions of the record should be presumed to support the district court's actions. 
Finally, even assuming any error occurred with regard to the acquittal of the persistent 
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violator enhancement, Mr. Carmouche asserts that any error was harmless in light of 
the court's statements and disposition at sentencing. 
In Mr. Carmouche's cross-appeal, he asserts that the prosecutor in this case 
committed misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the prosecutor 
elicited testimony regarding his invocation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unlawful searches, and then subsequently argued the invocation of 
Mr. Carmouche's constitutional rights as proof of his guilt of the charged offenses. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Darren Carmouche was charged with attempted strangulation, second degree 
kidnapping, aggravated battery, and felony domestic violence. (R., pp.32-34; 57-59.) 
The State subsequently alleged four separate sentencing enhancements - three 
persistent violator sentencing enhancements for the charges of attempted strangulation, 
kidnapping, and domestic violence, as well as an allegation that Mr. Carmouche used or 
attempted to use a deadly weapon during the commission of the alleged aggravated 
battery. (R., pp.41-43.) The State subsequently amended its allegations of sentencing 
enhancements to reflect four allegations that Mr. Carmouche was a persistent violator. 
(R., pp.60-64.) 
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of the alleged 
victim, Kirsteen Redmond. (Trial Tr. 1, p.71, Ls.12-15.) She testified that, at the time of 
the alleged altercation, she and Mr. Carmouche were living together. (Trial Tr., p.71, 
Ls.16-23.) Ms. Redmond testified that, on that day, she and Mr. Carmouche were using 
1 For ease of reference, citations to the primary transcript of the trial proceedings in this 
case are made herein by reference to "Trial Tr." All other citations to the transcript are 
made by reference to the date of the proceeding transcribed. 
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methamphetamine and had been for several days. (Trial Tr., p.73, Ls.6-10; p.109, Ls.1-
5.) She claimed that she and Mr. Carmouche began fighting while high on 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.6-8.) The fight, according to Ms. Redmond, was 
based upon Mr. Carmouche's belief that she was having an affair with a man that the 
two of them worked with. (Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.9-12.) According to Ms. Redmond's 
testimony, the fight turned physical. (Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.17-23.) 
Ms. Redmond testified that, when Mr. Carmouche was dissatisfied with the 
answers she was giving him to his questions about whether she was involved with this 
man, he started punching her in the face. (Trial Tr., p.74, L.19 - p.75, L.9.) By her 
estimate at trial, Mr. Carmouche punched her over 50 times throughout the fight. (Trial 
Tr., p.76, Ls.10-21.) She then claimed that Mr. Carmouche grabbed her head and 
slammed it into a wall, and then hit her in the chest and legs with the handle of a 
baseball bat. (Trial Tr., p.76, L.22 - p.78, L.7.) Ms. Redmond also testified that 
Mr. Carmouche grabbed her around the throat with both hands and choked her. (Trial 
Tr., p.78, L.16 - p.79, L.3.) When asked why she did not leave during the course of this 
fight, Ms. Redmond responded that Mr. Carmouche continually positioned himself 
between her and the door and threatened to kill her. (Trial Tr., p.79, Ls.7-15.) She 
further claimed that Mr. Carmouche threatened to kill her and her children if 
Ms. Redmond called the police. (Trial Tr., p.81, Ls.6-13.) 
Ms. Redmond testified that, after the fight stopped, Mr. Carmouche made her 
some food and attempted to tend to her wounds. (Trial Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.4.) 
When police arrived later, she testified that she pretended to be asleep at first. (Trial 
Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.86, L.1.) According to Ms. Redmond's testimony, Mr. Carmouche 
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had pulled the blanket over her head to cover her completely when police began 
knocking on the door and instructed her to feign sleep. (Trial Tr., p.86, Ls.2-9.) 
Ms. Redmond admitted that she did not initially tell police officers that her injuries 
were caused by Mr. Carmouche upon eventually speaking to police. (Trial Tr., p.87, 
Ls.3-5.) She claimed that she first told police that she was injured falling down the 
stairs, then claimed that "people" had caused her injuries without specifying who. (Trial 
Tr., p.87, Ls.6-18.) Eventually, however, Ms. Redmond told police that Mr. Carmouche 
was the person who inflicted her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.14-25.) Ms. Redmond 
testified that her injuries included swelling around her face and ears, bruising all over 
her face, blood coming from her ear, some cuts on her scalp, chest pain, and a large 
bruise on her left thigh. (Trial Tr., p.90, Ls.6-13.) Ms. Redmond also testified that she 
had a fractured rib. (Trial Tr., p.124, Ls.8-11.) She further testified that, following the 
alleged strangulation, her throat was tender, she had difficulty swallowing, and her voice 
was raspy for several weeks after that. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.1-18.) 
With regard to her questioning by police, Ms. Redmond acknowledged that she 
was interrogated by two police officers for approximately an hour before claiming that 
Mr. Carmouche had harmed her. (Trial Tr., p.118, L.9 - p.119, L.25.) During this 
questioning, officers repeatedly suggested to Ms. Redmond that Mr. Carmouche was 
the source of her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.12-25.) She al.so testified that the officers 
made comments that Mr. Carmouche treated Ms. Redmond worse than their dog and 
that Mr. Carmouche could come back to kill her unless she told police that he harmed 
her. (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.9-18.) However, Ms. Redmond denied that her accusations 
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against Mr. Carmouche were the product of police coercion. (Trial Tr., p.125, L.21 -
p.126, L.7.) 
The State also presented the testimony of several law enforcement officers who 
were involved in the investigation of the charged offenses. First, the State presented 
the testimony of Officer Steven Uriguen of the Nampa Police Department. (Trial Tr., 
p.28, Ls.7-11.) Officer Uriguen was on patrol on the morning of the alleged altercation 
when he received a call for him to perform a welfare check regarding a potentially 
suicidal person. (Trial Tr., p.31, L.1 - p.32, L.7.) After unsuccessfully trying to find the 
man who placed a call to a suicide hotline, who Officer Uriguen knew as "Darren", the 
officer arrived at Mr. Carmouche's residence. (Trial Tr., p.32, L.2 - p.34, L.13.) 
The officer initially received no response when he knocked on Mr. Carmouche's 
door. (Trial Tr., p.34, Ls.14-20.) After knocking harder, Officer Uriguen heard a male 
voice inside the home call out that everything was fine and the officer could leave. (Trial 
Tr., p.34, L.21 - p.35, L.5.) But Officer Uriguen told the man inside, subsequently 
identified as Mr. Carmouche, that he was not going to leave until the officer could verify 
that Mr. Carmouche was alright. Officer Uriguen further told Mr. Carmouche that the 
officer would break the door down if Mr. Carmouche did not come outside. (Trial Tr., 
p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.5.) 
Mr. Carmouche then came out of his house to talk with the officers outside of his 
house. (Trial Tr., p.36, Ls.14-19.) Mr. Carmouche informed the police that he had 
called the suicide hotline, and explained that he was upset due to some individuals 
having "hit on" his girlfriend. (Trial Tr., p.37, Ls.16-24.) During Officer Uriguen's 
testimony, the prosecutor questioned the officer about the fact that Mr. Carmouche 
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initially did not permit police to look into or enter his home during the initial point of his 
being questioned and that he had invoked his Fourth Amendment rights in the process. 
(Trial Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.1.) 
Although Mr. Carmouche expressed to the officers that he did not wish them to 
enter his house, he did allow Officer Uriguen to open the front door and call out to 
Ms. Redmond. (Trial Tr., p.38, L.20 - p.39, L.3.) The prosecutor again elicited further 
testimony from Officer Uriguen regarding Mr. Carmouche not permitting officers to enter 
his home. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.4-14.) Eventually, the officer convinced Mr. Carmouche to 
permit Officer Uriguen to stick his head in the doorway to try to talk to Ms. Redmond. 
(Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.9-14.) 
After the officer again called out to Ms. Redmond and received no response, 
Officer Uriguen convinced Mr. Carmouche to allow him to put more of his body inside 
the house to check for Ms. Redmond. (Trial Tr., p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.9.) From this 
vantage, Officer Uriguen testified that he could observe disarray in the living room, 
along Ms. Redmond, who was laying on the couch with her back to the officer. (Trial 
Tr., p.40, Ls.4-15.) Officer Uriguen once again told Ms. Redmond that she needed to 
come outside and talk to the officers. (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.19-25.) 
Ms. Redmond did not respond at first to the officer's commands. (Trial Tr., p.41, 
Ls.1-2.) Mr. Carmouche then began to encourage Ms. Redmond to come outside and 
speak with police. (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.3-8.) After a time, Ms. Redmond came outside of 
the house wrapped in a blanket. (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.9-12.) When she came outside, 
Officer Uriguen testified that he observed a large bruise over Ms. Redmond's left and 
right eyes, along with dried blood on her face and a scratch on her chest. (Trial Tr., 
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p.41, Ls.13-18.) Later, the officer saw a large bruise on Ms. Redmond's leg. (Trial Tr., 
p.43, Ls.13-17.) 
Because there were several officers at the scene, Officer Uriguen had two other 
officers wait outside with Mr. Carmouche, and then the officer went inside the house to 
question Ms. Redmond about her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.42, L.20.) After 
talking with her for about an hour, Officer Uriguen called for paramedics to treat 
Ms. Redmond's injuries. (Trial Tr., p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.12.) The officer then questioned 
Mr. Carmouche briefly. (Trial Tr., p.50, Ls.14-20.) Although Mr. Carmouche did not 
initially reveal that Ms. Redmond was injured or explain how she was injured, he 
eventually stated that someone else had caused her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.50, L.21 -
p.51, L.4.) Officer Uriguen also received permission from Ms. Redmond to search the 
home. Inside, he found numerous items scattered around, as well as broken items, and 
a hole in one of the walls with what appeared to be blood nearby. (Trial Tr., p.44, L.15 -
p.45, L.22.) Additionally, Officer Uriguen located a baseball bat in an upstairs room and 
saw clumps of hair in a bathroom garbage can. (Trial Tr., p.45, L.23 - p.46, L.3.) 
Although the apartment looked to be in disarray, the officer could not testify as to 
whether this was the condition of the apartment at any time prior to the morning of the 
alleged altercation. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.19-22.) He also did not see any bloody rags, 
clothing, or signs of blood in any sink other than the small drop of what the officer 
believed to be blood near a hole in the wall. (Trial Tr., p.62, L.4 - p.64, L.21.) 
Sergeant Mike Wagoner of the Nampa Police Department also testified on behalf 
of the State. (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.11-13.) As with Officer Uriguen, Sergeant Wagoner 
responded to Mr. Carmouche's home on the morning of the alleged altercation. (Trial 
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Tr., p.134, Ls.10-17.) When the officer arrived at the scene, officers were already 
standing outside with Mr. Carmouche. (Trial Tr., p.135, L.10 - p.136, L.18.) 
Mr. Carmouche did not appear to be agitated or aggressive toward the officers, and 
Sergeant Wagoner could not observe any marks or blood stains on him anywhere. 
(Trial Tr., p.152, Ls.7-19.) 
Shorty thereafter, Sergeant Wagoner testified that his attention was diverted 
when Ms. Redmond also came out of the house. (Trial Tr., pp.9-18.) The officer 
testified that Ms. Redmond was walking slowly out of the apartment, as though she 
were in pain. (Trial Tr., p.318, Ls.11-17.) He also saw that her face was swollen and 
bruised. (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.4-15.) Given her observable injuries, Sergeant Wagoner 
and Officer Uriguen took Ms. Redmond inside the home to question her. (Trial Tr., 
p.139, L.24 - p.140, L.3.) This questioning took over an hour. (Trial Tr., p.140, Ls.4-6.) 
During this questioning, Sergeant Wagoner testified that Ms. Redmond informed 
him that she had been struck by a bat. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.7-8.) Based on this, the 
officer located a baseball bat in an upstairs bedroom which Ms. Redmond stated was 
the bat that she had been hit with. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.6 - p.144, L.6.) The officer 
additionally testified that Ms. Redmond claimed that Mr. Carmouche slammed her head 
into a wall. (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.5-9.) Sergeant Wagoner testified that he examined the 
wall in the kitchen, where Ms. Redmond claimed that this occurred, and that he did find 
a hole in the wall that was approximately the same height as Ms. Redmond's head. 
(Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.5-18.) 
Another of the officers who responded to Mr. Carmouche's residence, Officer 
John Weirum, also testified at trial. (Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.7-12.) Officer Weirum is a crime 
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scene investigator who was called to Mr. Carmouche's home. (Trial Tr., p.176, L.16 -
p. 178, L.17.) After initially waiting outside with Mr. Carmouche for over an hour, Officer 
Wei rum walked through the house to videotape various items of interest. (Trial Tr., 
p.181, L.23 - p.183, L.5.) Among the items noted by the officer in his testimony were a 
small baseball bat that had been removed from an upstairs bedroom, a couple of 
clumps of hair on an ottoman and on the floor of the living room, and a small amount of 
what appeared to be blood in the kitchen. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.19 - p.184, L.16.) 
However, Officer Weirum was unable to say whether the swabs taken of what appeared 
to be blood were ever actually tested. (Trial Tr., p.190, Ls.5-15.) 
On cross-examination, Officer Weirum testified that he had never been in 
Mr. Carmouche's apartment prior to the morning following the alleged altercation, and 
therefore could not say what the condition of the apartment had been before entering it. 
(Trial Tr., p.197, L.22 - p.198, L.5.) The officer further acknowledged that he was not 
aware of any testing for blood or fingerprints of any items within the home. (Trial Tr., 
p.199, Ls.11-16.) Officer Weirum also did not recall seeing any injuries on 
Mr. Carmouche during the time he was outside of the residence on that morning. (Trial 
Tr., p.203, Ls.16-18.) 
Detective Troy Hale was the next witness presented by the State. (Trial Tr., 
p.222, L.24 - p.223, L.3.) Detective Hale interviewed Mr. Carmouche at the police 
station. (Trial Tr., p.225, L.13 - p.226, L.14.) According to the detective, when asked 
how Ms. Redmond acquired her injuries, Mr. Carmouche stated that he thought she had 
left the apartment in the middle of the night and came home injured. (Trial Tr., p.227, 
Ls.2-11.) When asked who he thought injured Ms. Redmond, Mr. Carmouche 
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responded that he suspected two of his co-workers, but would not tell Detective Hale 
the names of these men. (Trial Tr., p.228, Ls.11-21.) According to the detective's 
testimony, Mr. Carmouche was skeptical when told that Ms. Redmond had told police 
that he was the source of her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.229, L.21 - p.230, L.9.) However, he 
admitted on cross-examination that Mr. Carmouche did not appear to be aggressive or 
angry towards Detective Hale during the interview. (Trial Tr., p.236, L.14 - p.237, L.15.) 
Finally, the State presented the testimony of Detective Angela Weekes of the 
Nampa Police Department. (Trial Tr., p.244, Ls.7-16.) As the primary investigator in 
Mr. Carmouche's case, Detective Weekes was responsible for making decisions as to 
how the investigation would proceed. (Trial Tr., p.280, Ls.19-24.) In this capacity, 
Ms. Weekes testified that she decided not to forensically test any material suspected of 
being blood, and not to test the baseball bat recovered by police for finger prints. (Trial 
Tr., p.282, L.10 - p.283, L.10.) She testified that she did not do so because none of the 
information received by police from either Mr. Carmouche or Ms. Redmond indicated 
that any individuals other than those two had been present in the home. (Trial Tr., 
p.283, L.19 - p.284, L.3.) 
However, on cross-examination, Detective Weekes admitted she was aware that 
Ms. Redmond had, at one point, made statements that other people had been the ones 
to have perpetrated the assault against her. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.3-8.) The detective 
further acknowledged that evidence of another person's fingerprints on the bat could be 
exculpatory evidence. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.9-14.) Additionally, Detective Weekes 
testified that x-ray examinations of Mr. Carmouche's hands did not reveal any evidence 
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of injuries, despite Ms. Redmond's claim that he had punched her more than 50 times 
over the course of several hours. (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.1.) 
In addition to these officers, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Mark 
Burriesci, who was an emergency room physician who attended to Ms. Redmond's 
injuries. (Trial Tr., p.163, L.7 - p.165, L.9.) Dr. Burriesci testified that Ms. Redmond 
had bruising on her left ear, the left side of her face, and on the back of her head. (Trial 
Tr., p.168, Ls.12-18.) There was also bruising around her eyes and lacerations on her 
lip and right ear, along with a fractured tooth. (Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.16-21.) Dr. Burriesci 
testified that Ms. Redmond also had abrasions on her neck and complained of chest 
discomfort. (Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.22-24.) An x-ray revealed that one of Ms. Redmond's 
ribs was fractured. (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-25.) The doctor testified that Ms. Redmond 
also had scattered bruising throughout her body. (Trial Tr., p.168, L.25 - p.169, L.8.) 
Following the presentation of the State's evidence, Mr. Carmouche presented the 
testimony of his alibi witness, Richard Damore. (Trial Tr., p.293, Ls.14-16.) He testified 
that he was a friend of Mr. Carmouche. (Trial Tr., p.294, Ls.3-13.) According to 
Mr. Damore, Mr. Carmouche was with him at the time of the charged offenses. (Trial 
Tr., p.294, L.21 - p.295, L.2.) He testified that he had picked Mr. Carmouche up a 
couple of days before the charged offenses. According to Mr. Damore's testimony, he 
saw Ms. Redmond on the morning he picked up Mr. Carmouche, and she had no 
observable injuries at that time. (Trial Tr., p.295, L.3 - p.296, L.6.) He then drove 
Mr. Carmouche back to the place where he was staying at the time - in a shed behind a 
house - where the two men did methamphetamine over the course of the next two 
days. (Trial Tr., p.296, L.7 - p.299, L.3.) 
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Mr. Damore testified that, upon returning to Mr. Carmouche's home, the 
residence was in a state of disarray and Ms. Redmond looked "battered." (Trial Tr., 
p.299, L.10 - p.300, L.4.) Ms. Redmond was also very angry with Mr. Carmouche for 
being gone. (Trial Tr., p.299, L.21 - p.300, L.4.) Given the fact that Ms. Redmond 
looked injured, coupled with her angry response towards Mr. Carmouche, Mr. Damore 
then left Mr. Carmouche's home. (Trial Tr., p.300, Ls.5-15.) 
Mr. Damore did admit that, in addition to being close friends with Mr. Carmouche, 
the two were also incarcerated together prior to his trial. (Trial Tr., p.298, Ls. 7-11; 
p.303, Ls.7-21.) He denied that he and Mr. Carmouche discussed Mr. Carmouche's 
pending charges while they were incarcerated. (Trial Tr., p.303, L.12 - p.304, L.9.) 
Mr. Damore further claimed that no one witnessed Mr. Carmouche during the time that 
Mr. Carmouche was staying with Mr. Damore. (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.18-21.) This 
included the woman who owned the home behind which they were staying. (Trial Tr., 
p.306, Ls.12-16.) In addition, Mr. Damore denied that Mr. Carmouche had sought to 
induce him to testify falsely in Mr. Carmouche's trial. (Trial Tr., p.312, L.22 - p.315, 
L.10.) 
Mr. Carmouche also testified on his own behalf. (Trial Tr., p.326, Ls.8-13.) He 
testified, as was testified by Mr. Damore, that he was with Mr. Damore at the time of the 
alleged offenses; and that he only became aware of Ms. Redmond's injuries upon 
returning home thereafter. (Trial Tr., p.326, L.21 - p.328, L.12.) Mr. Carmouche 
testified that Ms. Redmond was very angry that he had not been home, and Mr. Damore 
left because of this. (Trial Tr., p.329, Ls.5-23.) According to Mr. Carmouche's 
testimony, Ms. Redmond told him that, on the prior evening, she had invited two other 
12 
men over while he was gone and she was injured by them. (Trial Tr., p.330, Ls.13-18.) 
Although he tried to get Ms. Redmond to go to police several times, Mr. Carmouche 
testified that this did not happen. (Trial Tr., p.330, L.25 - p.331, L.7.) Eventually, he 
and Ms. Redmond argued. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.8-20.) Mr. Carmouche testified that he 
called a suicide hotline as a result of this argument. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.21 - p.332, 
L.16.) Mr. Carmouche denied having struck, choked, or threatened Ms. Redmond. 
(Trial Tr., p.335, Ls.9-25.) He further testified that he had lied to police when he claimed 
to have been home the previous night - according to Mr. C;:irmouche, he was worried 
about the potential consequences of his drug use and therefore lied because he was 
scared. (Trial Tr., p.336, L.12 - p.337, L.10.) 
On cross-examination, the State questioned Mr. Carmouche about the 
inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his prior statements to police, as well as 
his failure to provide police with the alibi that he testified to at trial. (Trial Tr., p.349, L.23 
- p.355, L.1.) Mr. Carmouche also admitted that he had sent Ms. Redmond a letter 
while incarcerated in which he apologized to her. (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.9-22.) 
Mr. Carmouche claimed that he apologized to Ms. Redmond out of guilt for not having 
been there at the time she was injured. (Trial Tr., p.359, L.15 - p.360, L.6.) 
The State then called a rebuttal witness to the stand, Andrea Deaugustineo. 
(Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.16-17.) Ms. Deaugustineo owned the home where Mr. Damore 
claimed to have been staying with Mr. Carmouche at the time of the alleged offenses. 
(Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.20-21.) While she acknowledged that Mr. Damore stayed behind 
her house in a shed, Ms. Deaugustineo denied that she had ever seen Mr. Carmouche 
there. (Trial Tr., p.368, L.14 - p.370, L.6.) 
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During closing arguments, the State referenced the fact that Mr. Carmouche 
closed the door behind him when he first went outside his home to talk to police. (Trial 
Tr., p.378, Ls.6-7.) The prosecutor then continued: 
When they asked about his girlfriend he had a fight with, well, she's 
asleep. You can't see her. I know my rights. You can't go in. Why? 
Why, if he came home and found her beaten this way and heard 
these stories? Would that be your response? 
(Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.8-12 (emphasis added).) 
The jury convicted Mr. Carmouche of attempted strangulation, kidnapping, 
aggravated battery, and felony domestic battery. (Trial Tr., pA 10, L.24 - p.411, L.8; R., 
pp.133-135.) Thereafter, Mr. Carmouche proceeded to a bench trial on the State's 
persistent violator allegations. (11/12/10 Tr., p.1, Ls.5-20.) During this trial, the State 
presented evidence of Mr. Carmouche's driver's license, and attempted to put into 
evidence an ILETS report regarding his driver's license information that included his 
social security number. (11/20/10 Tr., p.20, L.7 - p.31, L.10.) Although the officer 
testifying for the State claimed that she was familiar with how to run a criminal history 
check using this program, she admitted that she was not the custodian of these records, 
these records were not kept by the Nampa Police Department itself, and the officer was 
not even familiar with what the acronym "ILETS" stood for. (11/20/10 Tr., p.32, L.3 -
p.33, L.17.) Although Mr. Carmouche did not object to the prior testimony during which 
the officer recited what the ILETS report indicated his social security number to be, the 
State's request for the admission of the ILETS report itself was withdrawn by the State 
in the face of Mr. Carmouche's hearsay objection. (11/20/10 Tr., p.31, L.4 - p.35, L.5.) 
Following the presentation of the State's evidence, the district court determined 
that the State had "barely" met its burden of establishing the prior convictions necessary 
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to sustain the State's persistent violator allegations. (11/20/10 Tr., p.60, Ls.13-19.) The 
trial court then indicated its intent to enter a judgment reflecting such. (11/20/10 Tr., 
p.60, Ls.13-19.) 
However, no such judgment or order was ever entered. Instead, the district court 
subsequently entered a written order of its factual findings and legal conclusion that 
Mr. Carmouche was not a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.156-162.) After 
reviewing the testimony and evidence presented, the district court determined that its 
prior consideration of the officer's testimony as to the contents of the ILETS report was 
in error. (R., p.156.) The district court ultimately held that the State had not presented 
sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Carmouche's identity as the subject of the prior 
alleged felony convictions. (R., pp.158-162.) Accordingly, the district court entered an 
order acquitting Mr. Carmouche of these allegations. (R., pp.162; 180-181.) 
Despite the fact that Mr. Carmouche had been factually acquitted of the 
persistent violator allegations by the district court, the State nevertheless filed a motion 
to reconsider this acquittal with the district court. (R., pp.169-172.) In this motion, the 
State argued that the proper remedy for the evidentiary error identified by the district 
court in acquitting Mr. Carmouche was to order a new trial. (R., pp.170-172.) The State 
did not acknowledge within this motion that the district court had found insufficient 
evidence to support the State's allegations. (R., pp.170-172.) 
Following a hearing on the matter, the district court denied the State's motion for 
reconsideration and entered a formal judgment of acquittal on the State's persistent 
violator allegations. (R., pp.180-181.) Thereafter, Mr. Carmouche filed a motion for a 
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mistrial or, alternatively, a new trial with the district court. (R., pp.183-202.) This motion 
was denied by the district court. (R., pp.231-267.) 
Mr. Carmouche was sentenced to 15 years, with four years fixed, for each of his 
convictions of attempted strangulation, second degree kidnapping, and aggravated 
battery. For his conviction of domestic battery with traumatic injury, Mr. Carmouche 
received a sentence of 10 years, with six years fixed. (6/20/11 Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, 
L.6; R., pp.299-300.) Each of these sentences was ordered to run concurrently. 
(6/20/11 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-8; R., p.300.) 
The State filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's judgment of 
acquittal on the persistent violator sentencing enhancement allegation. (R., p.212.) 
Mr. Carmouche likewise timely appealed from his judgments of conviction and 
sentences. (R., p.309.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court dismiss the State's appeal because this appeal is barred by 
Mr. Carmouche's constitutional protection against double jeopardy? 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that the State's appeal is not brought in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy, has the State failed to 
show error on the part of the district court in acquitting Mr. Carmouche of the 
State's persistent violator enhancement allegations? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
when the prosecutor argued evidence of Mr. Carmouche's refusal to permit 





This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because This Appeal Is Barred By The 
Constitutional Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy Set Forth In The Fifth Amendment 
A. Introduction 
As part of its claims on appeal, the State asks this Court to hold that the district 
court erroneously entered a judgment of acquittal after excluding from its consideration 
improper hearsay evidence. The State now seeks a new trial as an alternative ground 
of relief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) However, because the district court's order 
constituted a factual acquittal on the merits, and a resolution of a material element of 
the persistent violator allegation in Mr. Carmouche's favor, the Fifth Amendment's 
prohibition against double jeopardy precludes this remedy. Accordingly, because the 
relief requested by the State is constitutionally unavailable, the State's claims on appeal 
are moot and should be dismissed by this Court. 
B. Standard of Review 
Constitutional issues are issues of pure law that this Court reviews de nova. 
See, e.g., State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 513 (2007). This Court also exercises de 
novo review over questions of jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 
(2009); Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 653 (Ct. App. 2008). The question of the on-
going justiciability of a case is likewise an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. See, 
e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 952 A.2d 1, 15 (Conn. 2008). That is because, 
"justiciability is a question of the jurisdiction of the court over .the matter at issue." State 
v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 801 (1991). 
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C. This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because This Appeal Is Barred 
By The Constitutional Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy: 
Mr. Carmouche asserts that the district court, upon excluding some of the State's 
evidence in this case, resolved an essential element of the offense of felony driving 
under the influence in his favor and, therefore, the State's instant appeal seeks a 
remedy in violation of his Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. 
Because double jeopardy principles preclude the State from seeking retrial on its 
persistent violator sentencing allegation, Mr. Carmouche submits that the State's appeal 
is moot and therefore should be dismissed. 
1. The Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy Precludes 
Retrial Of A Defendant Following An Acquittal That Resolved An Element 
Of The Offense In The Defendant's Favor, Regardless Of The Legal 
Soundness Of Any Ruling Excluding The State's Evidence 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
prevents the State from seeking a second prosecution for the same offense after an 
acquittal. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497-498 (1984); see also Ball v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). It is this prohibition that generally precludes the 
State from seeking a new trial through the pursuit of an appeal after the defendant has 
been acquitted of the charged offense. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply 
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, "it is one of the 
elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial 
by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear erroneous." Green v. 
United State, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). This is because, "the State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense 
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and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as 
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Id. 
at 187-188. 
Whether a defendant has been acquitted by a trial court of an offense for double 
jeopardy purposes turns upon whether the district court, in acquitting the defendant, 
resolved some or all of the factual elements of the offense in the defendant's favor. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Martin Linen Supply Co. has held that the test for whether an 
acquittal has occurred is "whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually 
represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the 
offense charged." Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571. And the result of an 
acquittal presents a double jeopardy bar regardless of the underlying soundness of the 
trial court's ruling upon which the acquittal is predicated. 'The fact that 'the acquittal 
may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing 
legal principles' ... affects the accuracy of that determination but it does not alter its 
essential character." United States v. Smalis, 476 U.S. 140, 144 n.7 (1986) (quoting 
United State v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978)) (omissions in the original). 
Given this, when a trial court acquits a defendant of an offense, the State is 
precluded from seeking to appeal that acquittal in order to obtain a retrial or any other 
subsequent proceedings in which any factual issues regarding the underlying offense 
will be litigated: 
When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to 
proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has 
no proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of 
the accused in having an end to the proceedings against him. The 
Superior Court was correct, therefore, in holding that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause bars a postacquittal appeal by the prosecution not only when it 
20 
might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate into 
'"further proceedings of some sort devoted to factual issues going to the 
elements of the offense charged."' 
Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145-146; See also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 
(1978) ("judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars further prosecution on any 
aspect of the count and hence bars appellate review of the trial court's error"). 
2. The Existence Of Two Prior Felony Convictions Is An Essential Element 
Of The Sentencing Enhancement As A Persistent Violator Under 
l.C. 19-2514; And The District Court Resolved This Element In 
Mr. Carmouche's Favor Upon Excluding Some Of The State's Evidence, 
And Thereafter Acquitted Mr. Carmouche Of This Enhancement; And 
Therefore The State's Appeal Is Barred By Double Jeopardy 
Mr. Carmouche was alleged to have been a persistent violator of the law, and 
therefore eligible for a sentencing enhancement with regard to each of the State's 
charged offenses. (R., pp.60-64.) Idaho Code § 19-2514 provides generally that any 
person who has been found to have two prior felony convictions, not arising within the 
same incident, is eligible for a sentencing enhancement as a persistent violator of the 
law upon a third conviction. See l.C. 19-2514; State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344 (Ct. 
App. 1986). Upon proof of at least two prior felonies, the statutory maximum 
punishment for any felony offense is extended to up to life in prison, with a statutory 
minimum sentence of at least 5 years. Id. 
Following the evidentiary portion of the bench trial on the State's persistent 
violator enhancement allegation, but prior to entering any formal order of conviction, the 
district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order acquitting 
Mr. Carmouche of the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.156-163.) 
The district court also entered a separate written order acquitting him of this 
21 
enhancement. (R., pp.180-182.) In acquitting Mr. Carmouche, the district court rested 
its decision on the failure of the State to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
Mr. Carmouche's identity as the same individual formerly convicted in the prior 
judgments presented by the State. (R., pp.158-162.) After this acquittal, double 
jeopardy prohibitions attached to this allegation and the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precludes the State from seeking a second trial on the felony allegation through this 
appeal. As such, this Court should dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
The acquittal of Mr. Carmouche by the district court in this case is similar to that 
found by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Howard to preclude the relief sought by 
the State on appeal under double jeopardy grounds. See State v. Howard, 150 Idaho 
471, 478-482 (2011 ). In Howard, the Court noted that an acquittal for double jeopardy 
purposes occurs whenever there is a '"resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the 
factual elements of the offense charged."' Id. at 478-479 (quoting Martin Linen Supply, 
430 U.S. at 571 ). The Howard Court found that the district court's exclusion of evidence 
relating to prior convictions for purposes of a charge of felony driving under the 
influence fell within this definition. Id. at 479-480. Because the State bore the burden of 
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the prior convictions of driving under the influence 
in order to establish its charge of felony driving under the influence, the Howard Court 
held that the district court's acquittal of the felony enhancements barred the State from 
obtaining the relief sought on appeal. Id. at 480-482. 
Because the state of the acquittal in Howard and that in this case are nearly 
identical, this Court should do the same. Moreover, the district court, although 
indicating its belief that the State had "barely" passed the threshold for proof beyond a 
22 
reasonable doubt at the persistent violator bench trial, never entered any formal or 
general verdict of guilty based upon factual findings that would open the door to permit 
the State's appeal. See Howard, 150 Idaho at 481; United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 
358, 366-367 (1975). For example, the United States Supreme Court in Lee v. United 
States noted that the trial court's comments that there was "no question about [the 
defendant's] guilt," and that guilt had been established, "beyond any reasonable doubt 
in the world" were insufficient to constituted a general verdict of guilt. Lee v. United 
States, 432 U.S. 23, 28 n.4 (1977). 
Moreover, the recent United States Supreme Court Opinion in Blueford v. 
Arkansas sets forth that, where a formal entry of a finding of guilt has not yet been 
made, and where there is nothing to prohibit further deliberations on any finding of guilt 
or innocence prior to memorialization of the verdict, even a clear statement that the fact 
finder has determined guilt or innocence on an offense is not sufficient to terminate 
jeopardy. See Blueford v. Arkansas,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2012). In 
Blueford, the jury in the defendant's first trial informed the trial court that the jury had 
unanimously rejected the State's charge of first degree murder, but could not reach a 
consensus as to the lesser charge of manslaughter. Id. at 2049. When the jury was 
unable to reach a verdict as to the lesser charge, the district court declared a mistrial 
prior to the entry of any formal verdict form by the jury that memorialized the jury's 
unanimous finding that the State had not established its capital murder charge. Id. 
When the State sought to retry the defendant in Blueford on .the capital murder charge, 
the defendant asserted that this would violate his Fifth Amendment protection against 
double jeopardy in light of the jury's statement that it had acquitted him of the offense. 
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The Blueford Court rejected the notion that the jury's express statement that it 
had acquitted the defendant was sufficient for purposes of double jeopardy. Blueford, 
132 S. Ct. at 2050-52. The crux of the reason why the Court reached this holding was 
that there was nothing to prevent the jury, after initially informing the district court that it 
had acquitted the defendant of the charge of capital murder, from reconsidering the 
issue of guilt or innocence and reaching a different result pr.ior to the entry of a formal 
order regarding such a finding. Id. 
Similarly, in this case there was nothing preventing the district court from 
revisiting the evidence presented at the bench trial on the persistent violator 
enhancement prior to the entry of its written findings of fact and conclusions of law - at 
which point the district court in this case made a finding of an acquittal. The district 
court's statement at the close of the presentation of evidence during the bench trial on 
the persistent violator enhancement is not meaningfully distinguishable from the oral 
statement rendered by the jury in Blueford indicating an acquittal. Accordingly, the 
district court's statements at this trial do not constitute a verdict, formal or otherwise, for 
double jeopardy purposes. The only actual verdict in this case with regard to the 
persistent violator enhancement is that acquitting Mr. Carmouche. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Opinion in United States v. Blanton is also 
highly instructive for this Court given the similarity to the facts of this case. The 
defendant in Blanton was charged with a sentencing enhancement based upon the 
State's allegation that he had three prior violent felony convictions. United States v. 
Blanton, 476 F. 3d 767,768 (91h Cir. 2008). He faced a bifurcated trial in which his 
underlying criminal charge was tried to a jury, but the sentencing enhancement was 
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tried before the district court. Id. at 769. The defendant challenged the State's use of 
two of the three convictions alleged on the basis that the prior offenses were non-jury 
juvenile adjudications that could not stand as predicate offenses for the enhancement. 
Id. The district court agreed with the defendant's assertion, excluded the evidence of 
the prior juvenile convictions, and thereafter entered a judgment of acquittal based upon 
the legal insufficiency of the remaining State's evidence. Id. The State in Blanton filed 
a notice of appeal from the acquittal. Id. The defendant asserted that the State's 
appeal was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and 
argued, in the alternative, that the district court's exclusion of the evidence was proper. 
Id. 
The Blanton Court determined that, regardless of the legal soundness of the 
district court's exclusion of the State's evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the 
State's appeal because the district court rendered an acquittal of the sentencing 
enhancement by finding that the remaining evidence presented by the State was legally 
insufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 770. The court then noted that it was 
irrelevant for double jeopardy purposes whether the acquittal was based on legal error, 
therefore, jeopardy attached to the trial court's judgment of acquittal, "whether it was 
made in error or not." Id. at 771. Because double jeopardy barred the State's appeal, 
the court in Blanton dismissed the appeal. This Court should do the same. 
This view is further consistent with what the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
recognized, in dicta, in State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656 (Ct. App. 1993). There, the 
court recognized that if the district court excludes evidence in support of an element of a 
criminal offense and an acquittal ensues, "the state is given no second chance through 
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a retrial nor an opportunity to reverse the acquittal by challenging the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling on appeal." Id. (emphasis added). 
The district court's actions, in this case, are analogous to the trial court's actions 
in Sanabria. In that case, the court at first admitted evidence at trial that the defendant 
was a participant in an unlawful gambling business that participated in "numbers 
betting," even though the initial charge against the co-defendants was brought pursuant 
to a statutory section that only rendered unlawful gambling activity related to horse 
races. Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 56-58. Although the court had admitted the State's 
evidence regarding alleged numbers betting activity against the defendant, and further 
initially denied defense counsel's motion to exclude or strike the State's evidence, the 
trial court subsequently determined that the State's evidence should be excluded. Id. at 
57-59. After excluding this evidence, the trial court then granted the defendant's motion 
for a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 59. 
The Sanabria Court held that the prohibition against double jeopardy barred a 
second trial once the district court decided to exclude or strike the State's evidence, and 
then subsequently entered an order acquitting the defendant of the charged offense. Id. 
at 63-78. In addition, the trial court in Sanabria indicated that, had it not excluded the 
evidence regarding the "numbers betting," it would not have granted the judgment of 
acquittal. Id. at 60. (R., p.276.) However, this did not preclude the Court in Sanabria 
from concluding that double jeopardy precluded retrial of the defendant in light of the 
court's acquittal. Id. at 77-78. 
At base, the State's main contention in this appeal is that the district court should 
not have excluded from its consideration the evidence proffered by the State in an 
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attempt to prove Mr. Carmouche's prior convictions. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.6-8.) 
However, such a purported basis for overcoming the prohibitions of Double Jeopardy 
has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sanabria: 
The Government's real quarrel is with the judgment of acquittal. While the 
numbers evidence was erroneously excluded, the judgment of acquittal 
produced thereby is final and unreviewable. Neither 18 U.S.C. § 3731 not 
the Double Jeopardy Clause permits the government to obtain relief from 
all of the adverse rulings - most of which result from defense motions -
that lead to the termination of a criminal trial in a defendant's favor. To 
hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection whenever a 
trial court error in his favor on a midtrial motion leads to an acquittal would 
undercut the adversary assumption on which our system of criminal justice 
rests, and would vitiate one of the fundamental rights established by the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 77-78 (internal citations omitted). 
The relief request by the State in this appeal is prohibited under the operation of 
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy. Accordingly, the State's 
appeal in this case is moot and should be dismissed by this Court. See State v. Long, 
153 Idaho 168, 169-171 (Ct. App. 2012). 
11. 
Assuming, Arguendo, That The State's Appeal Is Not Brought In Violation Of The Fifth 
Amendment Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy, The State Has Failed To Show Error 
On The Part Of The District Court In Acquitting Mr. Carmouche Of The State's 
Persistent Violator Enhancement Allegations 
A. Introduction 
As was previously argued, because Mr. Carmouche's constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy precludes the State from seeking retrial following his acquittal, 
the State's argument that a new trial on the persistent violator enhancement is without 
27 
merit. Additionally, even if this were not the case, the State has failed to show any error 
in the district court's exclusion of improper hearsay evidence from its consideration. 
B. Assuming, Arguendo, That The State's Appeal Is Not Brought In Violation Of The 
Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy, The State Has Failed To 
Show Error On The Part Of The District Court In Acquitting Mr. Carmouche Of 
The State's Persistent Violator Enhancement Allegations 
1. Because The State Has Failed To Present An Adequate Record Of The 
Full Proceedings Relating To Mr. Carmouche's Acquittal Of The Persistent 
Violator Allegation, The Missing Portions Of The Record Should Be 
Presumed By This Court To Support The District Court's Ruling In This 
Case; And The Invited Error Doctrine Should Be Applied By This Court To 
Estop The State's Claim That The District Court Erred By Failing To 
Consider Inadmissible Evidence 
Following the entry of the district court's order setting forth its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in acquitting Mr. Carmouche of the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement, the State filed a motion with the district court seeking reconsideration of 
this ruling. (R., pp.156-162; 169-172.) A hearing was held on this motion on 
February 10, 2011, wherein the State and Mr. Carmouche presented their respective 
arguments on the acquittal and the issues in controversy were narrowed through the 
course of this argument. (R., pp.176-179.) Although the minutes for this proceeding 
are part of the appellate record in this case, the actual transcript of this proceeding is 
not in the present appellate record, despite the fact that the substance of this 
proceeding was devoted to the arguments surrounding the claims now being advanced 
by the State in this appeal. 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have consistently 
held that missing portions of the appellate record relating to the order being challenged 
on appeal will be presumed to support the ruling of the district court. See, e.g., State v. 
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Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488 (2009); Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258 (Ct. App. 
2010). "This Court will not presume error on appeal, and an appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating error through the record." Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 488. Accordingly, 
when the party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, the Court presumes 
that the absent portion of the record supports the findings of the trial court." Id. 
This presumption applies with greater force here, as the minutes from the 
hearing not presently a part of the record on appeal reflects that the State at the hearing 
on its motion to reconsider conceded one of the two issues that the State now seeks to 
press on appeal. To the extent that the minutes from this hearing reveal a rough sketch 
of the substance of this hearing (although not elucidating any detail on the specific 
arguments of the parties), these minutes show a critical concession by the State. 
Following the arguments of the parties, the minutes from the February 10, 2011, hearing 
show that the district court summarized several issues as not being in dispute. (R., 
pp.177-178.) This included the following: 
... the State is not raising or disputing the issue that the hearsay does not 
fall within any exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in Idaho Rules of 
Evidence; nor does the State contend that the Court lacked authority 
to correct it's erroneous oral ruling before entry of a Judgment 
and/or Order; or that the Court lacks the right to exclude from its 
consideration, inadmissible hearsay evidence that is not objected to 
and for which no motion to strike was made. 
(R., pp.177-178 (emphasis added).) 
"Idaho courts have long held that 'one may not successfully complain of errors 
one has consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors are not 
reversible."' State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226 (1985)). The minutes reflect that the State acquiesced in 
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the district court's determination that the court was permitted to do the very thing that 
the State now complains of on appeal. Given this, the doctrine of invited error should 
apply to preclude the State from asserting on appeal that the district court erred in 
excluding from its consideration improper hearsay testimony. In the alternative, the 
minutes from the February 10, 2011, indicate that this objection was expressly not made 
to the district court, and therefore has not been preserved for appeal. Accordingly, the 
arguments being advanced on appeal by the State with regard to the court's exclusion 
from its consideration of inadmissible hearsay testimony have been waived for purposes 
of appeal. See, e.g., State v. Donohoe, 126 Idaho 989, 991 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
that, absent fundamental error, unpreserved objections are waived for purposes of 
appeal). 
2. The District Court Properly Excluded Improper Hearsay Evidence From Its 
Consideration With Regard To The State's Evidence Tendered In Support 
Of The Persistent Violator Allegation In This Case 
The State has challenged, on appeal, the district court's exclusion from its 
consideration testimony in the form of hearsay evidence regarding Mr. Carmouche's 
social security number. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) The district court initially received 
this evidence at the bench trial on the persistent violator allegation without objection, but 
thereafter excluded the improper evidence from its review of the evidence in acquitting 
Mr. Carmouche of the persistent violator allegation. (R., pp.156-162.) The sole basis 
for the State's argument is its claim that the district court, sitting as the trier of fact 
during this bench trial, was legally required "to treat any hearsay admitted without 
objection as competent evidence supporting its verdict." (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) 
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However, this is the opposite standard of what case law in Idaho dictates with regard to 
bench trials. 
From the outset, the State relies almost entirely on only one case for its position 
in this appeal: Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 105 (2011 ). In Phillips, part of the 
evidence admitted at the jury trial was evidence that the appellant asserted was 
inadmissible hearsay. Phillips, 151 Idaho at 104-105. In challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence on appeal, the appellant argued that the reviewing court should exclude 
this evidence when reviewing whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. Id. at 105. The Phillips Court held that, because the hearsay was 
admitted without objection, "the jury could consider it." Id. (emphasis added). This 
case is immediately distinguishable because Idaho applies a much different rule where 
the trier of fact is a judge, rather than a jury. 
Rather, where the trier of fact is a judge, the presumption in Idaho has long been 
that the trial court did not consider legally inadmissible evidence that is presented to it 
in reaching its findings of fact and conclusions of law. See, e.g., Shrum v. Wakimoto, 
70 Idaho 252, 259 (1950); Goody v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 Idaho 523 (1933); 
Brinton v. Johnson, 41 Idaho 583 (1925). This presumption that a trial court will not 
consider inadmissible evidence, even when admitted into evidence at a bench trial, was 
extended by the Idaho Supreme Court into criminal bench trials as well as civil ones. 
State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707, 710 (1991). The Powell court explained as its holding 
as creating, "'a presumption on appeal that the trial judge, knowing the applicable rules 
of evidence, will not consider matters which are inadmissible when making his 
findings."' Id. (quoting State v. Miles, 464 P.2d 723, 728 (Wa. 1970)). 
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In fact, this legal distinction was noted by the trial court itself in acquitting 
Mr. Carmouche of the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. The district court 
noted, "When the Court is the trier of fact, the Court may disregard any inadmissible 
evidence in making its findings. The mere fact that a witness testifies as to inadmissible 
hearsay without objection or without a motion to strike does not require the Court to 
ignore that the evidence is inadmissible." (R., p.161.) 
Contrary to the State's assertion, not only is the trial court in a bench trial not 
required to consider evidence known by the court to be inadmissible, the legal 
presumption exists that the trial court will not do so. This Court presumes regularity in 
the proceedings before it, and the State's position would require trial courts to ignore the 
very rules of law that judges are charged with knowing and upholding. Because the 
State's argument is contrary to controlling precedent regarding improperly received 
evidence at a bench trial, the State's argument is without merit. 
3. Even Assuming Error In The District Court's Exclusion Of The Evidence, 
Any Error Is Harmless 
Mr. Carmouche further asserts that, even assuming any error on the part of the 
district court in excluding the State's evidence, any such error is harmless. The case of 
State v. Hairston is instructive for this Court on this issue. In Hairston, the State argued 
that the district court should not have proceeded to directly sentence the defendant 
upon permitting the defendant to withdraw his plea to the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1999). However, under 
the Court of Appeals' review of the sentencing record, there was an absence of any 
indication that the district court would have imposed a higher sentence upon the finding 
32 
that the defendant in Hairston was a persistent violator of the law. Id. at 566-567. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that, even if any error was committed by the 
district court, this error was harmless. Id. 
Mr. Carmouche submits that the record in this case fails to disclose any reason 
to believe that his sentences would be different in any respect had he been convicted of 
the persistent violator sentencing enhancements alleged by the State. Mr. Carmouche 
received three sentences with a 15-year aggregate term and a fourth unified sentence 
providing for up to 10 years' incarceration. (6/20/11 Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, L.6.) Each of 
his sentences were well above the mandatory minimum sentencing requirement 
established by l.C. § 19-2514. Moreover, the district court's own findings in support of 
the sentences imposed demonstrated that the court was both aware of, and materially 
considered, Mr. Carmouche's prior criminal history in setting these sentences. (6/20/11 
Tr., p.50, L.11 - p.51, L.3.) 
There is nothing in the record that suggests that the district court's sentencing 
determination would have been different in any manner had the court not acquitted 
Mr. Carmouche of the sentencing enhancements alleged by the State in this case. 




The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
When The Prosecutor Argued Evidence Of Mr. Carmouche's Refusal To Permit Police 
To Enter His Home As Supporting An Inference Of Guilt Of The Charged Offenses 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in this case elicited testimony from police officers that 
Mr. Carmouche initially refused to permit police to enter and search his home. In 
closing arguments, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider this fact as evidence 
indicating Mr. Carmouche's guilt of the charged offenses. Mr. Carmouche submits that 
this constituted prosecutorial misconduct that rose to the level of a fundamental error. 
B. Standard of Review 
Because there was no contemporaneous objection to the elicitation of the 
testimony, and to the prosecutor's closing argument, that are being challenged in this 
appeal, this Court reviews Mr. Carmouche's allegation of prosecutorial misconduct 
under the three-part test for fundamental error articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 226 (2010). Under this standard, fundamental error is established and reversal is 
required if the defendant can establish that: ( 1) the alleged error violates one or more of 
the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear and obvious from 
the record; and (3) there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
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C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error, When The Prosecutor Argued Evidence Of Mr. Carmouche's Refusal To 
Permit Police To Enter His Home As Supporting An Inference Of Guilt Of The 
Charged Offenses 
In this case, the prosecutor both elicited testimony from police officers that 
Mr. Carmouche had initially refused to permit police to enter his home, and 
subsequently argued this evidence to the jury during closing arguments as proof of 
Mr. Carmouche's guilt. Mr. Carmouche asserts that this improper questioning and 
argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error. 
The prosecutor, in presenting the testimony of Officer Uriguen in this case, 
intentionally elicited testimony regarding Mr. Carmouche having invoked his Fourth 
Amendment right against the warrantless entry of the officers into his home. (Trial Tr., 
p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.1; p.39, Ls.4-14.) During closing arguments, the prosecutor further 
noted that Mr. Carmouche closed the door behind him when he first went outside to 
speak with police. (Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.6-7.) The prosecutor then argued to the jury: 
When asked about his girlfriend he had a fight with, well, she's asleep. 
You can't see her. I know my rights. You can't go in. Why? Why, if 
he came home and found her beaten this way and heard these 
stories? Would that be your response? 
(Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.8-12 (emphasis added).) In repeatedly asking the jurors in this case 
what reason Mr. Carmouche would have for refusing to consent to let police search his 
home, coupled with asking jurors whether they - as innocent parties to the charged 
offense - would have done the same, the prosecutor was implying that 
Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his Fourth Amendment right stood as proof of his guilt. 
The direct inference to the jury was that an innocent person would not have refused to 
permit police entry to search his or her home. This was misconduct. 
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As to the first prong of the Perry analysis, Mr. Carmouche asserts that the 
misconduct in this case violated his right to a fair trial and his Fourth Amendment right 
to refuse to consent to police searches. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state 
shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, 
"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
lo. CONST. art. I, §13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartz miller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 ( 1978). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated, in the context of a 
prosecutorial misconduct claim, '"Every person accused of crime in Idaho has the right 
to a fair and impartial trial."' State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 (1980)). '"It is the duty of the prosecutor to 
see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is 
submitted to the jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44 (1903)). "Prosecutors 
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy 
an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their 
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury 
than they would give to counsel for the accused." Irwin, 9 Idaho at 44. Prosecutors 
"should not 'exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the 
verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the 
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accused."' Id. Moreover, a prosecutor "should never seek by any artifice to warp the 
minds of the jurors by inferences or insinuations." Id. 
In Christiansen, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a prosecutor's act of 
eliciting testimony regarding Christiansen's refusal to consent to a search of his 
business. Id. Christiansen was charged with numerous arson-related counts after his 
business burned down in the middle of the night. Id. at 464-465. During the 
questioning of one of the police officers who interrogated Christiansen, the prosecutor 
asked whether the officer asked Christiansen for permission to search the property. Id. 
at 465. The officer responded that he had and that Christiansen refused to give consent 
to the search. Id. 
On appeal, the Christiansen Court first held that although no contemporaneous 
objection was made to the testimony, the error was fundamental. Id. at 470-471. The 
Court deemed the improper testimony as being analogous to those cases where a 
prosecutor use of a defendant's silence as evidence of guilt. Id. at 470. The 
Christiansen Court stated, "The same rationale that precludes evidence of an accused's 
assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment Rights offered for the purpose of either 
impeachment or inferring guilt precludes evidence of the accused's assertion of his or 
her Fourth Amendment rights offered for the same purpose." Id. The Court then 
concluded that the prosecutor committed misconduct in Christiansen's case: "There was 
no excuse for the prosecuting attorney seeking to elicit Sergeant Clark's opinion as to 
Christiansen's veracity during police interrogation or testimony that Christiansen refused 
consent to a search of his business premises. The prosecuting attorney's actions were 
clearly misconduct." Id. at 471. 
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A prosecutor's elicitation of testimony regarding a defendant's invocation of his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free of warrantless searches, and subsequent use of that 
evidence in closing argument to support an inference of guilt, have since and 
consistently been recognized as a violation of due process that may provide the basis to 
support a finding of fundamental error. See State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 488-489 
(Ct. App. 2012); State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 639-641 (Ct. App. 2011). The 
Wright court noted that, "eliciting testimony from a witness regarding a defendant's 
refusal to consent to a search, when used for purposes of inferring guilt, is prosecutorial 
misconduct and may be fundamental error."2 Wright, 153 Idaho at 489. 
The use of this evidence as proof of guilt by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments in this case is similar to that present in Betancourt, as both the prosecutor's 
remarks in Betancourt and those made by the prosecutor in this case called upon the 
jury to evaluate whether a refusal to permit police to search a premises was inconsistent 
with the actions of a person innocent of the charged offense. See Betancourt, 151 
Idaho at 639-640. These remarks were deemed in Betancourt to meet the first prong of 
the Perry test for fundamental error, "because the prosecutor's comments during closing 
argument and rebuttal violated Betancourt's right to a fair trial." Id. at 640. 
2 While the Wright court ultimately found that fundamental error had not been 
established, this conclusion was only due to the fact that the defendant in Wright had 
not established the violation of any reasonable expectation of privacy that would be 
protected under the Fourth Amendment - and therefore the alleged "search" did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Wright, 153 Idaho at 489-490. In contrast, the 
invocation of Mr. Carmouche's Fourth Amendment right in this case was directed 
against a search of Mr. Carmouche's home - and a "person's home 'is accorded the full 
range of Fourth Amendment protections."' See State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523 
(1986) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)). 
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And, just as in Betancourt, the due process violation in this case is clear from the 
record. By expressly arguing Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his constitutional rights, 
and then asking the jury why he would do so if he were innocent - even more, whether 
they themselves would do so if they were in Mr. Carmouche's place - the prosecutor 
was drawing a direct line between Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights and the conclusion that he did so due to his guilt of the charged 
offense. Accordingly, the second prong of the Perry test for fundamental error has been 
met 
Finally, the improper argument by the prosecutor regarding Mr. Carmouche's 
invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights for purposes of inferring guilt cannot be said 
to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, there was substantial dispute 
as to the source of Ms. Redmond's injuries. Mr. Carmouche consistently contended 
that they were inflicted by other individuals and further denied that he had struck, 
strangled, or otherwise threatened Ms. Redmond. (Trial Tr., p.326, L.8 - p.364, L.19.) 
By Ms. Redmond's own statements to police, "other people" were the source of her 
injuries. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.12-18; p.154, L.2 - p.155, L.7.) It was only after more 
protracted questioning by police, who suggested Mr. Carmouche as the source of her 
injuries, that Ms. Redmond implicated Mr. Carmouche as the individual who inflicted her 
wounds. (Trial Tr., p.118, L.9-p.119, L.25; p.154, L.2-p.155, L.7.) 
Additionally, the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Carmouche did not have any 
blood on his person at the time police arrived at his home, nor did he have any 
observable injuries to his hands. (Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.10-21.) Actual x-ray examinations 
of his hands that were subsequently conducted likewise did n·ot show any injuries. (Trial 
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Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.1.) This evidence casts strong doubt on the State's 
allegations that Mr. Carmouche repeatedly hit Ms. Redmond with a closed fist - by her 
estimate, over 50 times - over the course of many hours. (Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.10-21.) 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case violated Mr. Carmouche's due process 
right to a fair trial, and was apparent from the face of the record. Moreover, given the 
conflicting evidence presented at trial as to the source of Ms. Redmond's injuries, there 
is a reasonable possibility that this misconduct contributed to the jury's verdict. 
Accordingly, Mr. Carmouche asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case rose 
to the level of a fundamental error entitling him to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Carmouche respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the State's appeal 
as moot due to the fact that Mr. Carmouche's constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy precludes retrial on the State's persistent violator allegation. In the alternative, 
he asks that this Court affirm the district court's acquittal of the persistent violator 
allegation. Mr. Carmouche further asks that this Court reverse his judgment of 
conviction and sentences for attempted strangulation, kidnapping, aggravated battery, 
and felony domestic battery and remand this case for further proceedings in light of the 
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred in this case. In the alternative, has asks that this 
Court reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Carmouche's motion for a new trial 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 81h day of February, 2013. 
~RAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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